This article examines the merits of defining a class of offensive destructive cyber weapons as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It analyzes the growing danger of destructive cyber weapons in the future joint operating environment and the devastating effects they may have in the physical domain. Further, it outlines evidence that specifically coded, offensive destructive cyber weapons would meet the spirit and intent of the three academic conditions for categorization as WMD. It argues the merits of categorizing a class of destructive cyber weapons as WMD, and addresses important factors required to examine advantages afforded to policy makers. Towards this end, the paper offers two recommendations for consideration to account for the value in designating a class of destructive cyber weapons as WMD. The recommendations include a proposed cyber deterrence theory of "Attributed Response Assured," and outline how this theory could support a U.S. cyber policy of strategic ambiguity. Further, it recommends defining acceptable behaviors for cyber activity by the international community. In the absence of a U.N.-led effort, the establishment of a Proliferation Security Initiative-type agreement could further steps to clarify "norms" and communicate "redlines" to potential adversaries. These steps would assist policy makers in the collective effort towards enabling the security of a networked world against the most dangerous cyber threats capable of causing mass casualties or mass destruction. recommends defining acceptable behaviors for cyber activity by the international community. In the absence of a U.N.-led effort, the establishment of a Proliferation Security Initiative-type agreement could further steps to clarify "norms" and communicate "redlines" to potential adversaries.
INTRODUCTION
The destructive potential of unconstrained cyber warfare is a maturing threat that warrants the full attention of defense policy makers. To put the danger and the corresponding policy opportunities in perspective, one can view the emergence of specifically coded offensive destructive cyber weapons in context of the world in 1946. The previous year America had dropped atomic bombs to end World War II, and in the aftermath came the genesis of new strategies and policies on the nature of warfare. Although it proved impossible to foresee the impact atomic weapons would have in constructing new ways of thinking about the future character of war, policy makers fully embraced strategies capable of unleashing the destructive potential of this continuation of politics by yet another means.
To avoid the possibility for unconstrained use of offensive cyber weapons capable of causing mass casualties or mass destruction, the United States, in partnership with the international community, should evaluate the emerging role of cyber weapons in the context of the future joint operating environment. Towards that end, this article argues that defining a class of offensive destructive cyber weapons as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) presents multiple advantages to US decision makers, to include advancing international and domestic cyber policy options to defend against and deter cyberattacks purposefully designed to cause mass casualties or mass destruction. This article presents the argument in full acknowledgement that cyber weapons must remain valid tools for future military operations. As such, the argument is limited in scope to those specific offensive destructive cyber weapons designed to cause mass casualties or mass destruction.
A review of the growing danger of destructive cyber weapons is necessary to assess the appropriateness of establishing a class of those weapons as WMD. A key component in addressing this issue is to examine the evolution of offensive destructive cyber weapons and their destructive potential in the physical domain. It is the destructive effects of special weapons that policy makers would normally evaluate for the appropriateness to align them under the WMD umbrella. Finally, it will offer two recommendations to assist policy makers in advancing cyber policy options to defend against and deter cyberattacks purposefully designed to cause mass casualties or destruction. It also proposes a cyber deterrence theory of Attributed Response Assured. Although specific audiences may value the additional details afforded by classified information, the scope of discussion and sources of information in this article are purposefully limited to open source publications in order to enable conversations with a broader audience.
IS IT A WMD? ASSESSING CYBER'S DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL
The question on if the destructive nature of cyber weapons warrants "spe- 
WHY NOW: EXAMINING THE EVOLUTION OF CYBER WEAPONS
In 2008, the Air Force commissioned a RAND study to review the operational realities of being able to "fly and fight in cyberspace." 20 The resulting product, titled Cyber Deterrence and Cyberwar, determined the greatest danger to the United States from cyberspace might be operational rather than strategic. The study's authors concluded, "strategic cyberwar, by itself, would annoy but not disarm an adversary." 21 To engage in strategic cyberwar, RAND argued, is to assume a level of risk that an adversary worthy of such an attack has the capability to respond militarily in ways that would do more than simply annoy. RAND also challenged any assertion that cyber warfare can win a nation's wars independently and decisively. Even if cyber threats were assessed as operational rather than strategic, the report provided a comprehensive argument for why cyber deterrence is necessary to ensure the United States maintains superiority in the information medium. In short, approximately 10 years ago cyber
weapons were perceived as Weapons of Mass Annoyance and the cyber topic in general proved to be a subject defense senior leaders and policy makers struggled to comprehend.
For example, the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) gave a presentation in September 2012 at the Air Force Association's annual conference in
Washington DC

22
. During his remarks, the CSAF in part focused on cyber security, an issue he viewed as an Air Force priority. He openly acknowledged and described in colorful details his ignorance on the topic. Air
Force Chief of Staff requested cyber professionals "dumb down" briefings and avoid using "cyber talk" so he and other senior leaders could better understand the problem. 23 He predicted it would take 30 years to replace those in the top ranks who lacked a strategic understanding of cyber with experts. It is unlikely this reference disparaged senior leaders, and CSAF's comments were likely purposeful in an attempt to add humor to a discussion made in a public forum. However, the comments suggest that only five years ago there were senior defense leaders who were unprepared to address cyber policy development, or possibly even appreciate the potential role of cyber weapons. Due to the rapid nature of advancements in the cyber domain, it becomes imperative that senior defense leaders have sufficient understanding of how cyber contributes to the defense of America and can articulate the need for new or updates to existing policy.
In June 2014, the National Defense University (NDU) Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction explored the potential of formally categorizing and recognizing cyber weapons as WMD.
24 Looking forward to the strategic future set in 2030, the authors wrote that it would be inappropriate and possibly disadvantageous to the United States to apply the WMD designation to cyber weapons at the time. Their rationale was the seemingly nascent state of cyber weapon policy and strategy development. Until the United States had a strategy that outlined how to operationalize cyber weapons, it seemed counterintuitive to add the WMD classification to cyber. For in doing so, they assessed there would be risk in prematurely constraining a capability that could in reality maximize flexibility options for decision makers. The NDU article further acknowledged that a cyber WMD treaty would normally be associated with provisions to limit cyber's use, or set in motion steps to eliminate or control certain cyber threats. With all the potential negatives, the report was unable to find any advantages to categorizing cyber as WMD. Another benefit is it helps avoid the potential for strategic miscalculation as it reinforces an understanding that any counterattack would be founded on attributing the source of the attack. It should motivate the international community to share information on cyber threats in order to avoid the potential for wrongful attribution or risk escalation. It also serves to reassure the international community, to include allies and adversaries alike, that the United States will not take action unless or until attribution is confirmed. Conversely, once an attacker's identity is confirmed, potentially involving the use of court-credible digital forensics, an adversary Hatch: Defining a Class of Cyber Weapons as WMD
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is assured the United States has the will and capability to respond at a time and place of its choosing, consistent with its national security policy.
A sufficient and credible investigative and forensics capability to assess attribution is the foundation of such a deterrence theory. It also places emphasis on developing capacity for a robust cybersecurity posture, further enabling deterrence by denial. Continuing this conversation towards an enduring solution should involve the international community.
RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 2:
International Engagement: Defining Cyber's Role in Strategic Deterrence
As the debate over security in cyberspace continues to resonate, an issue of primary concern should be the recognition that the cyber domain is international space. As such, activity in cyberspace must comply with applicable and relevant elements of international law. For those state or nonstate actors who choose to conduct offensive destructive cyberattacks, the effects could then be assessed as falling above or below a specific threshold of acceptable behavior. The United Nations should define that threshold and should initially consider drawing a line at cyber activity that produces WMD-type effects. Once a U.N.-led-international cyber WMD "redline" is established, it becomes clear which actions are unacceptable and warrant a response. However, proposals in the international community to establish even basic "norms" in the cyber domain have stalled, leaving it mostly unregulated. As such, establishing a cyber WMD "norm" within the cyber domain may not be achievable at present through a U.N. led effort.
A US-led approach may be necessary. In prepared remarks, the Trump administration's Homeland Security Advisor Tom Bossart said during the June 2017 "cyber week" conference that following the unsuccessful conclusion to the UNGGE to clarify how international law applies in cyberspace, notably in the areas of self-defense, state responsibility, and The PSI framework could be an effective means to move the cyberattack discussion forward internationally. Actions taken by participating nations would set a precedent of accepted behavior within the international community. It may further present decision space for key states, to include the United States, Russia, and China, to discuss differences in opinions over "norms" in cyberspace openly. At best, it affords more opportunities through tangible and observable acts to establish cyber "norms" with those countries viewed as potential US adversaries.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article analyzed the growing danger of destructive cyber weapons in the future joint operating environment and the devastating effects they may have in the physical domain. Further, it outlined evidence that specifically coded, offensive destructive cyber weapons would meet the spirit and intent of the three academic conditions for categorization as WMD. It argued the merits of categorizing a class of destructive cyber weapons as WMD, and addressed important factors required to examine advantages afforded to policy makers. Towards this end, the article offered two recommendations for consideration to account for the value in designating a class of destructive cyber weapons as WMD. The recommendations included a proposed cyber deterrence theory of "Attributed Response Assured," and outlined how this theory could support a US cyber policy of strategic ambiguity. Further, it recommended defining acceptable behaviors for cyber activity by the international community. In the absence of a U.N.-led effort, the establishment of a Proliferation Security Initiative-type agreement could further progress to clarify "norms" and communicates, "redlines." This progress would assist policy makers in the collective effort towards enabling the security of a networked world against the most dangerous cyber threats. The cyber WMD designation also requires further examination to assess if it may positively influence military equipment acquisition and procurement processes. It could drive a requirement to establish within applicable DOD policy publications, which may include the Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, a category for US weapon systems to be designated as "cyber mission critical" similar to the current "CBRN mission critical" designation.
48 Such a designation would enhance the resiliency and survivability of systems and crews to withstand the effects of a destructive cyberattack without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned mission. A "cyber mission critical" designation would act as a forcing function for the services to account for cyber resiliency and avoid acquisition of systems with cyber vulnerabilities. The importance of cyber resiliency was highlighted in August 2017, as the US Army had to issue an order to stop using specific drone aircraft procured from a Chinese manufacturer, as they were vulnerable to cyber malware.
49
While the greater issue of cyber is vast and complex, limiting it at present to the destructive potential of specific cyber weapons affords the opportunity to focus on the most dangerous malicious code, while avoiding likely contentious discussions related to broader cyber topics. These actions align with the DOD strategic goal of "being prepared to defend the US homeland and US vital interests from disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of significant consequence" as outlined in the 2015 DOD Cyber Strategy. 50 Policy makers can find multiple advantages that enable efforts to meet this goal by designating a class of specific offensive destructive cyber weapons as WMD. Similar to the collective efforts since 1946 to deter the use of nuclear weapons, history will likely judge the decision favorably if an outcome includes effectively deterring the use of unconstrained cyber weapons resulting in mass casualties or mass destruction. 
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